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Abstract: 
A committee of five uses majority rule for decisions on two public goods. Individual committee 
member preferences depend on a state of nature that is unknown to the committee members but 
the state of nature is known to two experts who have preferences about committee decisions.  
Experts have no vote on the committee but provide a recommendation to the committee at the 
opening of a meeting.  Two experts are selected who have known, opposing biases -a dyadic 
mechanism.  The results reveal that experts do not tell the truth but committee decisions are as if 
committee members know what the experts know.  The information transfer occurs because 
committee members anticipate the biases and properly infer the information held by the experts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper reports exploratory experiments focused on information aggregation within a 
committee organizational and experimental environment in which information aggregation is 
important and cheap talk is possible. The environment consists of conflicts that are prominent 
features of many models of political decisions.  Committee organization and decision procedures 
are designed and tested as mechanisms to facilitate informed collective decisions. The 
experiments are exploratory in the sense of a merger of variables typically thought to be 
governed by two different sets of principles and the absence of an overriding theory to integrate 
the two. On the one hand, models of committee decisions typically rest on voting theory and 
cooperative game theory and do not extend themselves to cover strategic revelation of 
information. On the other hand, models of strategic revelation of information rest on non-
cooperative game theory, which cannot explain the dynamic process of committee equilibration 
characteristic of majority rule voting groups. In the absence of an overriding model that 
integrates the two bodies of theory, the exploratory approach is attractive. 
 
An organization is created in which a specific form of competition between experts with 
conflicting preferences is imposed for the purpose of information aggregation. The experiments 
ask if the organization successfully facilitates information transfer within a challenging 
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environment.  The environment is more complex than those where non-cooperative game 
theories of cheap talk can be successfully applied. Truth telling is not incentive compatible. The 
nature of the conflict is also more complex than typically studied in committee processes.  The 
configuration of preferences is such that under full information majority rule equilibrium exists 
but committee members are not fully informed.  Uncertainty about the consequences of options 
exists and the only sources of information are people with biases. Thus, there is no common 
source of information to guide a proposal and voting process. The questions posed by the 
experiments are the degree to which information transfer and aggregation might occur within the 
organization and if they are observed what might be the underlying principles at work that create 
them. The answers are: (i) the information transfer takes place with remarkable accuracy; and (ii) 
much of the behavior of experts and committee members is anticipated by the underlying 
models, but behavior suggests that a more complex equilibrium concept than simple Nash is 
required to capture the interaction between the experts and the committee. 
 
The problem is centered on a committee or group that must make a collective decision in a 
classical Public Choice environment. The group must choose the levels of two public goods and 
the group is in conflict about the options. Individual preferences depend on a state of nature that 
if known, would influence the preferences of all participants but would not remove the conflict. 
The state of nature is known to a set of “experts” whose advice can be acquired by the 
committee.
2
  Advice of experts is in the form of recommendations of actions to be taken by the 
committee as opposed to a report that identifies the state of nature or facts that can be verified. 
Thus, the environment is complicated by the fact that the description and identification of the 
state is not part of an expert assessment available to the committee, reflecting the possibility that 
the language to describe the state as viewed by experts need not be the same (described 
parametrically) as the language used by decision makers.  Furthermore, the experts do not know 
the preferences of the decision makers except possibly as assessed thru repeated interactions, 
motions and votes.  This fact is an important difference with models of information revelation 
where the expert strategically positions well-crafted messages concerning the state of nature in 
the light of known receiver preferences in order to induce the response preferred by the expert.  
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 Thus, the environment consists of multiple senders and multiple receivers whose vote determines the public good 
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Dewantripont and Tirole (1999) who study the search incentives of experts in the light of preferences of a single 
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differences and similarities with the literature on “cheap talk” are worth noting. Information transfer and the 
possibility of a fully revealing (Nash) equilibrium in the case of multiple senders of state information and a single 
receiver has been explored by Battaglini (2002) and the case of one sender and multiple receivers is studied by 
Battaglini and Makarov (forthcoming) and by Vespa and Wilson (2014). In such games, each agent has an 
independent influence on the outcome while in the majority rule environment studied here; a single vote has an 
influence only in the case of a majority of one. Other important structural differences exist between the experiment 
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context explore the role of transparency of biases following the questions posed by Dickhaut, McCabe and Mukherji 
(1995).  
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In summary, the recommendations are points in a two dimensional space as opposed to sets of 
points or natural language.  The purpose is to make sure that the content of recommendation 
messages is common knowledge even though the information carried by the recommendations 
differs from voter to voter.  In more complex messages spaces such as ordinary language, the 
assumption of common knowledge about the message content cannot be maintained.  
 
The experts have their own preferences over the alternatives and thus, have incentives to 
influence the group. The lack of private goods prevents payment of experts based on information 
that might become available after the decision is made, so there is no way of structuring the 
institutional incentives of the experts to provide unbiased advice. At base, it is a problem of 
moral hazard exacerbated by the lack of commitment typical of cheap talk. 
 
The focus of this paper is on one specific type of mechanism as a step toward the challenge to 
design mechanisms that facilitate the successful transfer and aggregation of information held by 
experts to groups who must make a decision.  In a world of specialized information relevant for 
decisions of public goods, the problem is a familiar one.  Possible examples include policy 
determining committees that depend on expert testimony for information. In a sense, it is similar 
to the problem of designing legal processes that facilitate the accurate transfer and aggregation of 
information to a jury when the information is held and perhaps only partially exposed by those 
who have a self-interest in influencing the decision. Furthermore, the "truth" may never be 
known. 
 
The example mechanism studied here is “dyadic” in the sense that two experts are selected from 
those possible and will be called upon to offer proposed decisions and give advice to a 
committee. A group decision process for expert selection is not considered here, even though it is 
of considerable interest. Instead, the expert selection is imposed for testing purposes.  The 
selection is guided by four conditions: (i) the experts know the state with certainty; (ii) the 
experts have known biases in the sense that for a given state the divergence of expert preferences 
from the preferences of the decision makers is transparent; (iii) with respect to their interest in 
committee decisions, the experts are in conflict- playing a game with its own properly configured 
Nash equilibrium; and (iv) the preferences of individual committee members are not known to 
the experts. 
 
Thus, the dyadic mechanism depends on the selection of experts that have known biases relative 
to other preferences and have directly conflicting preferences. The competition between experts 
is designed to prevent them from colluding. The experimental issue is to determine if such a 
mechanism will facilitate a decision such that the uninformed voters choose as if they possessed 
the information about the state that is known only to the experts. The overall structure of the 
process has similarities with jury processes in which the experts with information about the state 
of nature, the defense and the prosecution, are involved in a zero sum game. However, the 
underlying preferences, conflicts, and models differ from those of jury decision problems
3
 and 
are more closely related to the pioneering work of Battaglini (2002) who develops conditions 
under which a single decision maker will receive truthful recommendations from two decision 
makers.
4
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2. The Testing Environment 
 
The experiments reflect two questions that are typically posed for testbed experiments used for 
studying mechanism designs
5
.  Will the mechanism work under parameters where it is supposed 
to work?  If it works, does it do so for understandable reasons?  The first question asks for a 
proof of principle. The second question asks if the behavior is consistent with the theory that led 
to the design as opposed to some random event.  Such design consistency is important for 
scalability. 
 
The experimental environment includes parametric features that challenge the design while 
exposing the reliability of the behavioral principles studied by the design.  The environment is 
not an attempt to capture the elements of any particular decision process found naturally 
occurring.  While the experimental environment is a simple environment, it is nevertheless real, 
with real people facing real incentives and using a real and well-defined process.  The simplicity 
should not be confused with any lack of reality.  If the mechanism does not work in the simple 
environment or if the principles are not reliable, then there is little reason to suspect it would 
work in a more complex environment.  If it does work in the simple environment, then 
experiments testing the reliability and robustness of the principles in more complex cases can be 
explored.  
 
Preferences are induced using classical experimental public choice techniques for public goods. 
The space of alternatives is the two dimensional Euclidian plane with variables x = (x1,x2),  
x1[0,200], x2[0, 150] that will be interpreted as the quantities of two public goods. 
Preferences are induced using U.S. currency.  Figure 1 is a hypothetical example in which the 
indifference curves are circles representing the values in terms of the Euclidian distance from an 
optimal point as will be the case in the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decision maker so full revelation of the state occurs.  In the environment studied here, full revelation of the state 
occurs but it is based on a different principle, It depends on known biases of the experts and it requires that more 
than one decision maker be informed.  
5
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Figure 1: Committees Options and Induced Preferences 
 
Seven agents indexed {1,2,3,4,5,A,B} will participate in a committee process in which one 
option will be chosen by majority rule.  All participants will be paid the value of the incentive 
function evaluated at that alternative. Incentive functions are of the form U
i
(x, s) where x = 
(x1,x2) and s = (s1, s2 ), which is interpreted as a state of nature that take values  s1[0,50] and 
s2[0,50] and is drawn from a uniform distribution. 
 
The preferences reflect a property of geometrical symmetry.  The change of state simply shifts 
the most preferred option of a decision maker. From a theoretical point of view, it is similar to 
the transformation of the origin of the commodity space used by Battaglini (2002). The point of 
maximum utility is moved but the shape of the indifference curves remains the same.  
Furthermore, all preferences are shifted in the same way.  If the maximum of one person is 
shifted up and to the right, then the maximum of other preferences are shifted in the same way.  
 
The first five agents are voters and agents A and B are “experts” in a sense to be described 
below. Induced preferences are all of the form U
i
(x,m
i
(s)) = (x - m
i
(s)) I (x - m
i
(s))

 where m
i
(s) 
is voter i’s most preferred alternative given the state s and I is the identity matrix.  So utility 
functions reflect a Euclidian distance to an individual maximum and indifference curves are 
circular. 
 
The state of nature operates to shift the preference of participants. For voting member in the 
experiment the shift is of the following forms.  
 
m
1
(s) = (35,27) +(s1,s2) 
m
2
(s) = (30,47) +(s1,s2) 
m
3
(s) = (44,43) +(s1,s2) 
m
4
(s) = (67,84) +(s1,s2) 
m
5
(s) = (93,29) +(s1,s2) 
 
The state of nature influences the preferences of experts in the same way as it influences the 
preferences of the voters. As will be explained below, the maximum of each is 5 units removed 
from core in each dimension and in opposite directions. 
 
m
A
(s) = (39,48) +(s1,s2) 
m
B
(s) = (49,38) +(s1,s2) 
 
Individual i knows m
i
(s) but does not know s until after all decisions are made. An individual 
voter knows nothing about the preferences of other voters.  However, each voter i knows 
something about the underlying preferences of the experts. Specifically, the voters know the 
fundamental biases of each expert relative to his own preference.  That is, voter i knows the 
vector of bias(A,i) = m
A
(s) - m
i
(s) and also knows bias(B,i) = m
B
(s) - m
i
(s). That is, while the 
voter does not know the vector s, the voter can make deductions about his/her optimum from 
information about the optimum of advisors A and B by just subtracting the bias. That is, for this 
environment, the key information elements for voter i are {m
i
(s), m
A
(s), m
B
(s)} and the observed 
choices of A and B.  The experts are uninformed about all preferences except their own. 
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Preferences are configured around a “base” configuration in which s = (0,0). For the s = (0,0) 
case, the preference configuration is contained in Figure 2. The maximums for all agents are 
shown.  The lines connecting the maximums represent the “contract curves” between pairs of 
agents. The set of Pareto Optimal alternatives are in the convex hull of the maximums. The 
majority rule equilibrium
6
 (the core of a game in effectiveness form) is the maximum of voter 3. 
With five members, voting the maximum of voter 3 would win at least three of the five votes 
when placed against any other alternative. As can be seen, the equilibrium is in the intersection 
of the “cross” of the contract curves.  The location of the optimal for expert A is always to the 
northwest of the optimal for committee member 3 and the location of the optimal for expert B is 
always to the southwest of committee member 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Base Parameters (signal is 0,0)  
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The state s = (s1, s2) is drawn independently and uniformly from [0,50]
2
.  Figure 3 displays the 
location of preferences if s = (0,0), the base preferences. Notice that this particular configuration 
with the cross connecting voter maximums remains as s takes different values. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, a change in s simply changes the location of the cross. Figure 4 illustrates the locations 
of the preference maximums as s ranges over all of its possible values. Notice that the structure 
of parameters allows a committee member to put bounds on the possible locations of expert 
preferences as dictated by the domain of s.  Both Figure 3 and Figure 4 provide a view of the 
location of preferences relative to each other and in relation to the entire range of the space of 
possibilities.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Expected value of optimums compared to base value options when s=(0,0) 
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Figure 4: Base Parameters: individual optimum given state is base plus state which is taken from the rectangle 
[0,50],[0,50] 
 
Fiorina and Plott (1978) discovered that the equilibrium point tends to be the outcome of 
spatially configured, majority rule committee processes that follow versions of Roberts Rules of 
Order. The Fiorina and Plott configuration is used because the equilibrium is a reliable model of 
a majority rule committee process under the conditions imposed here. That is, when the 
committee members operate with well-defined preferences (with certainty or uncertainty) the 
points near the majority rule equilibrium tend to emerge as the committee choice. This fact is a 
key feature for measuring the degree to which information is transferred and aggregated from the 
experts to the voting members of the committee.  If the information is aggregated and 
transferred, then the information about the state held by the experts will also be held by the 
voters.  If the voters know the state with certainty, the group choice will be the equilibrium that 
would exist if there was no uncertainty.  
 
If s is completely unknown, then the expected maxim for each voter is the center of the respected 
support for probabilities of s.  The equilibrium is shown on Figure 4 as at the intersection of the 
implied “cross”, which is the expected maximum for voter 3. That point is the equilibrium if 
individuals always choose among alternatives according to the expected utility given s is drawn 
from [0,50]
2 
 and if individuals have no additional information.  
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3. Why Should a Dyadic Mechanism Work? 
 
The mechanism is dyadic, consisting of two experts (in the sense of knowing the state with 
certainty) who are known to have opposing preferences, known biases, and communicate with 
the committee through a formal process. Specifically, the two experts are chosen because their 
preferences are diametrically opposed relative to the equilibrium given any state of the world. 
The committee equilibrium given the state is on the “contract curve” or “Pareto Optimal 
alternatives” for the pair. From the majority rule equilibrium, given any state of the world, 
Expert A prefers to go "up" from the equilibrium and to the left, while B’s optimal is down and 
to the right. Biases are known relative to each individual voter’s preference in the sense that a 
voter can infer their own preferences and thus infer the state, if the optimum of either expert is 
known. Of course, it is this bias relative to the preferences of voting members that is the key to 
the selection of experts but unknown is how the expert recommendations will respond to the 
competition and what committee members might infer from the expert advice.  The committee 
members know expert preferences but do not know what the expert knows and for that must rely 
on testimony.  
 
The process of using decisions and known preferences as tools for “inverting decisions” and 
inferring  information known to an insider has a long history of use in market experiments with 
asymmetric information.  It is a fundamental feature of rational expectations models and explains 
much market behavior (Plott and Sunder, 1982, 1988; Plott, 2000, Barner, Feri, and Plott, 2005). 
It is clearly evident in the information efficiency property of cascades where the existing high 
levels of information efficiency can be improved by voting institutions (Hung and Plott, 2001).  
The principle has been used in  political science and voting  experiments by McKelvey and 
Ordeshook (1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1990), Lupia (1994) and Dasgupta (2002). More recently, the 
property is used in parimutuel information aggregation mechanisms for the collection of 
information held in the form of intuitions among a dispersed population (Gillen, et.al. 2012). 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the geometry through which the inference works. If proposals by the experts 
accurately suggest the location of the expert’s maximum then any voter can deduce the state. The 
expert knows the state and has an interest in persuading the committee to choose that state.  The 
issue is whether or not the proposals and discussion reveal what the expert knows. In this 
context, the expert cannot tell what he or she knows. They can only make recommendations 
concerning what the committee decision might be. 
 
The choice of experts from the many possible experts that could have been imposed in the 
experimental environments reflects two features.  First, the experts must be in conflict relative to 
the (generalized) median committee member regardless of the state.  Secondly, the individual 
committee members must be able to infer their own preferences for public good levels from the 
estimated preferences of the experts.  That means what the underlying “triangularization” or 
“identification” dictated by the distances and angles must be possible.  Of course, how 
committee members might estimate the preferences of the experts from what they recommend, or 
if it can be done at all are different matters.  Of course, in the experimental environment there is 
a large set of possible experts that might not be available in naturally occurring situations. 
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Figure 5: Voting members know the biases of experts relative to the state of nature and relative to own preferences 
 
4. Procedures 
 
The experts remain the same throughout an experiment consisting of several decisions. Experts 
do not know the preferences of voters or each other. Each expert (privately) prepares a 
recommended alternative to the voters based on own preferences and information about the state 
and whatever information held about preferences of voters and the other expert that has been 
accumulated through experience on previous rounds.  Advice after initial recommendation 
appears to be important.  Experiences show that convergence is a property of many processes.  
As will become evident, the data show that the capacity for recommendation adjustment is used 
by the experts.  The experts do adjust but the exact role of the adjustments is not established.  
Adjustments of recommendations could be interpreted as “correcting opinions” that might have 
been drawn from previous recommendations or a refinement of a recommendation as a strategic 
response to the recommendation of the other expert.”  
 
Procedures with regard to experts are as follow. Each expert is informed about the state and 
prepares a recommendation about the committee choice. Both recommendations are prepared 
and submitted in private and announced simultaneously. That is, a recommendation cannot be 
made conditional on what the other expert recommended. The language of the experts was 
confined to recommendations for the final committee decision as opposed to what the state might 
be or information received from the experimenter. Experts cannot vote and cannot make 
motions. However, experts can comment during the discussions and give ordinal 
recommendations, e.g. move up. 
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Table 1: Experimental Conditions and Summary Results of Committee Decisions 
 
Information 
condition 
Calibration 
 
Full Information Limited information 
Experts: 
existence and 
performance 
feedback to 
voters 
Condition 1: 
y state public 
x state known to 
experts 
Condition 2: 
All voters are 
experts 
Condition 3: 
No experts 
(no information 
about states) 
Condition 4: 
Experts with no 
voter feedback 
about advice 
accuracy 
Condition 5: Experts 
with complete voter 
feedback about advice 
accuracy 
number of 
experiments 
4 1 1 8 7 
total decisions 
(periods) 
80 7 7 62 72 
Model x state public Fully informed voter 
model 
No voter 
information 
model 
Fully informed 
voter model 
Fully informed voter 
model 
error  
eq-mean (SD) 
  
 0.36 (11.4) 
 
1.1 (.5) 
 
1.3 (.5) 
 
6.9 (.6) 
 
9.5 (.7) 
Model  No voter 
information model 
Fully informed 
voter model 
No voter 
information model 
No voter information 
model 
error 
eq – mean (SD) 
 
-3.14 (20.25) 
 
16.4 (.2) 
 
17.9 (2.8) 
 
14.6 (.9) 
 
13.4 (.8) 
number of 
decisions closer 
to full 
information 
model 
   On average 10 
units closer and 
82% of decisions 
are closer to the 
full information 
model. 
On average 7 units 
closer and 64% of 
decisions are closer to 
the full information 
model. 
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Committees followed a modified Roberts Rules of Order. The system starts with a motion on the 
floor (a status quo), which can be changed by amendment and votes.  One proposed amendment 
is made at a time and voted up or down.  If an amendment passes, the amended motion becomes 
the new motion on the floor, which can be amended. If the amendment fails, the floor remains 
open for additional motions. The system stops if the question is called and the motion on the 
floor receives a majority vote of three voters. All payoffs are determined by the winning 
alternative. 
 
5. Experimental Design 
 
The experimental design is represented in Table 1. Five information conditions were studied. 
The underlying preferences were the same in all conditions except in condition 1 in which the 
preferences were placed slightly differently from the other four conditions. In all cases, the state 
was revealed to the experts and all procedures were followed as outlined in the sections above. 
Condition 1 can be viewed as an initial test in the special case of one dimension of uncertainty. 
In condition 1, the s1 state was given to the experts and the s2 state (the height on the vertical) 
was revealed publically. The state was randomly determined so the known value of the y 
dimension differed for each committee decision. The resulting committee problem was “single 
dimensional” because all uncertainty was confined to the x dimension (the horizontal 
dimension), even though the committee had to choose both dimensions.  Nevertheless, since the 
indifference curves are circles, the classical “single peaked preference condition” was always 
satisfied and thus, the fully informed core/equilibrium always existed at the most preferred 
alternative of the median voter along the known y axis. 
 
Since the structure of the parameters used for Condition 1 experiments are different from those 
of the other experiments, the data from those experiments are not included and analyzed with the 
other experiments.  However, a quick summary of the experiments will facilitate an 
understanding of the Table.  These experiments were conducted in a two dimensional space with 
a random date but one dimension of the state was public information.  So, from the point of view 
of the theory there was only one dimensions of uncertainty, the x dimension, which was known 
to the experts but not the voters. Two models are compared.  One holds that the outcome will be 
as if both dimensions are known with certainty, because the level of the x dimension will become 
known from the recommendations of the experts.  The other model holds that the 
recommendations of the experts will be regarded as cheap talk.  No information will be produced 
through the expert recommendations and the choice will be as if the voters regarded the x 
dimension as completely random. The measures from both models are listed. The error for the 
model based on information aggregation and the standard deviation of the error are both lower 
than the error of the model based on no information aggregation. In both cases, the errors are low 
and the standard deviations are relatively high, so the predictions of neither cannot be rejected as 
error free. However, the data demonstrate that the standard deviations of the alternative model 
are much higher. 
 
Condition 2 is a replication of the Fiorina and Plott experiments in which the state is publically 
known. The committee faced no uncertainty and thus, no independent expert advice existed.  All 
voters were experts. It is baseline against which we measure the degree of information 
aggregation and transfer.  If all information in other conditions is transferred, then the voters 
13 
 
should act as if they had complete information and thus the results should mirror the results of 
Condition 2. 
 
Condition 3 plays is a second baseline in the determination of whether or not information 
aggregation takes place. It is the case of complete uncertainty other than the public information 
about the distribution (independent uniform distributions with the same support) from which the 
state was drawn. No experts existed and the committees operated under complete uncertainty 
except for the common priors. Under the expected utility hypothesis, the equilibrium/core existed 
due to the symmetry of the environment. For all committee decisions, the core/equilibrium is the 
point (69,68) regardless of the underlying state.  The assumption that this will be the outcome in 
the absence of information is a key step in determining if information aggregation took place 
under other conditions. 
 
Conditions 4 and 5 are variations of the asymmetric information environment in which the voters 
have no private information about the state and the experts are perfectly informed.  The 
difference is the feedback given voters about the state and thus the accuracy of the expert 
recommendations. The purpose is to explore the sensitivity of the results to the possibility of 
reputational influences by the experts. The variables are similar to the nature of information used 
in retrospective voting models and experiments such as Collier, et al (1987) and McKelvey and 
Ordeshook (1990a). 
 
In Condition 4, voters were given no feedback about the state until all decisions were made and 
the experiment ended. Thus, experts had no obvious incentive to produce accurate 
recommendations and were free to recommend whatever might influence the committee to 
choose the most preferred option of the expert. Thus, a viable model would have the 
recommendations only existing as cheap talk that would be exaggerated to the maximum and 
thus, ignored by the voters. 
 
In Condition 5, voters were told the state after each decision. Thus, the voters could observe the 
historical accuracy of the experts and from that information the voters could constrict reputations 
of the experts.  A natural conjecture is that the experts would exaggerate less if the accuracy of 
their recommendations were to be revealed to the voters,  and that the information possessed by 
the experts would be aggregated and transferred to the voters.  
 
6. Results 
 
The first result provides both a baseline for analysis and a replication and generalization of 
previous results. The result focuses on the cases where the state is known to all committee 
members so information acquisition or transfer plays no role in the model. The Table contains 
error rates for a model that assumes information will be perfectly aggregated and also contains a 
model that assumes no information will be aggregated.  The question is which is more accurate.  
Notice the grid is 200 x 150 so the units are “small” relative to the grid.  The size of error must 
be interpreted  in the _light of the fact that “larger” errors are actually “small” relative to the 
grid.  The variances are so small all models would be rejected as statistically accurate.  
Conclusions reflect average model error divided by standard deviation of the data.  
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The first result is conveyed by Figures 6 and 7. Shown there are the displacements of final 
decisions minus the predicted equilibrium. Figure 6 includes the committee decisions made by 
fully informed voters. Figure 7 contains the decisions and the equilibrium for the uninformed 
voter decisions. As can be seen, the final decisions are close to the equilibrium with a slight bias 
to the right in the case of fully informed committee decisions in Figure 6. In the case of Figure 7, 
the completely uniformed voters, the final decisions are represented by the circles and tend to be 
exactly the same and almost exactly on the equilibrium. These results are similar to the results of 
Fiorina and Plott (1978).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Full State Information for Voters (Decision Minus Equilibrium): Condition 2 
 
 
 
Figure 7: No State Information for Voters (Committee Decisions and Uninformed  Equilibrium): Condition 3 
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Result 1: Equilibration principles are observed in operation. (i) Equilibration is observed under 
conditions of complete voter information about the state, i.e. Condition 2. (ii) Equilibration is 
observed under conditions of no voter information about the state (other than background 
randomness), i.e., Condition 3. 
 
Support. Table 1 contains the deviation of the data from the model equilibrium. Statement (i) is 
addressed by experiments under Condition 2, fully informed voters, where the mean error is 1.1 
units with a standard deviation of .5. While equilibration cannot be rejected the small standard 
deviation makes it appear close. Statement (ii) is addressed by Condition 3 and the error of 1.3 
and standard deviation of .5.  The equilibration is clear. Any alternative model that suggests that 
decisions were not sensitive to induced preferences or that decisions converge to some point 
other than the equilibrium would produce a large error.  For example, a model which asserts that 
the committee decisions would converge to the no information equilibrium when the committee 
is fully informed produces and error of 16.4. 
 
The second result reveals that the design does what it is supposed to do. The dyadic mechanism 
facilitates information aggregation and transfer. Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 contain the 
difference between the final committee decisions and the equilibria for Conditions 1, 4, and 5 
respectively. The aggregations are not perfect in the sense that the decisions are not made as if 
voters had private information about the state but decisions are close in a statistical sense and far 
from the behavior that would be observed if no aggregations at all took place. 
 
  
 
Figure 8: Y State Known to Voters But X State Known Only to Experts (Committee Decision Minus Equilibrium): 
Condition 1 
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Figure 9: No Voters Feedback About Expert Advice (Committee Decision minus Fully Informed Equilibrium): 
Condition 4 
 
 
  
 
Figure 10: Full Voter Feedback About Expert Advice (Committee Decision minus Fully Informed Equilibrium): 
Condition 5 
 
Result 2: Under the dyadic process, information is revealed and incorporated into decisions. (i) 
Under Condition 1 in which the y axis of the state was known publically the decisions are 
statistically indistinguishable from the equilibrium. (ii) Under Condition 4 and Condition 5 the 
decisions are substantially closer to the full information equilibrium than that case where no 
information is available. (iii) Decisions get slightly closer to the equilibrium when information 
about the state is available and can be used to judge the quality of past expert advice. 
 
Support. Appropriate statistics are in Table 1. (i) The hypothesis that committee decisions under 
Condition 1 are centered on the equilibria cannot be rejected. The mean error is 5.12 and the SD 
is 3.7. (ii) The hypothesis that committee decisions are centered on the equilibria can be rejected 
for both Condition 4 (error 6.9 and SD .6) and Condition 5 (error 9.5 and SD .7). However, under 
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both Conditions the decisions are closer to the full information equilibrium than to the 
uninformed equilibrium (a factor of 2 in the case of Condition 4 and a factor of approximately 
1.5 in the case of Condition 5) and the percentages of decisions closer to equilibrium are 82 and 
64. (iii) The hypothesis that the distance from the fully informed equilibrium is the same for 
Condition 4 and Condition 5 can be rejected. 
 
Of particular interest is the behavior of the experts. The behavior of voters and the fact that 
decisions reflect considerable information aggregation motivate an investigation.  Figures 11 and 
12 contain the individual expert recommendations relative to the equilibrium. Figure 11 contains 
the data for Condition 4 where no feedback about the state took place. Figure 12 contains the 
expert recommendations for the periods in which voters were told the actual state after each 
decision thus creating a possibility of reputation formation. The figures also contain the location 
of each expert’s preferred alternative relative to the equilibrium as a large dot.  Expert A is 
always up and to the left of the equilibrium and expert B is always down and to the right of the 
equilibrium. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Expert Advice Minus Perfectly Informed Equilibrium: No Feedback to Voter: Condition 4 
 
The lines are the regression of A recommendation and B recommendation respectively, with the 
intercepts constrained to (0,0) 
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Figure 12: Expert Advice Minus Perfectly Informed Equilibrium: Feedback: Condition 5 
 
The lines are the regression of A recommendation and B recommendation respectively, with the 
intercepts constrained to (0,0) 
 
Result 3: Experts behave strategically. (i) Experts do not propose their most preferred option. (ii) 
Experts act as if they are attempting to pull the average of the expert advice to become centered 
on their most preferred option. (iii) Experts do not propose the most extreme possible in the 
direction that they want the final decision relative to the state.   
 
Support. Figure 12 illustrates recommendations relative to equilibrium and expert ideal point. 
Statement (i) and (ii) follow from the fact that expert recommendations tend to be further from 
the equilibrium than their own optimal alternative. The regressions also support the conclusions 
by indicating that relative to the equilibrium the tendency for proposals is to be on the line that 
runs through the expert optimal. Result (iii) follows from the fact that the proposals are not at the 
border of the probability support for the state. 
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The average of pairs of expert recommendations in relation to the equilibrium provides insights 
about the process through which information becomes revealed by the dyadic mechanism. 
Figures 13 and 14 compare the average of pairs of recommendations to the location of the 
perfectly informed equilibrium. Basically, on average, the average of a pair of expert 
recommendations is not distinguishable from the perfectly informed equilibrium and suggests 
that recommendation biases and the strategic behavior of experts have sufficient structure to 
permit a reliable inference about the state location. As was established by Result 3, the experts 
exaggerate but they do not exaggerate "too much" and they are not arbitrary or purely random. 
Figure 13 contains data from the no feedback condition 4, and Figure 14 contains the 
recommendations from the decisions in which the quality of the expert advice will become 
known, the full feedback condition 5. The figures indicate that the variance under full feedback 
conditions (mean 4.11, SD 3.40) is smaller than under no feedback conditions (mean 8.12, SD 
5.82). When the experts know that the accuracy of their recommendation will be known, the 
variance of their recommendations is reduced and more accurate but the difference between 
these patterns of recommendations is not statistically significant. Those facts are summarized by 
the following result. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Mean Difference (Expert Advice Minus Perfectly Informed Equilibrium) No Feedback: Condition 4 
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Figure 14:  Mean Difference (Expert Advice Minus Perfectly Informed Equilibrium) Full Feedback: Condition 5 
 
The line is an unconstrained regression 
 
Result 4: An analysis of the pairs of expert recommendation leads to two conclusions. (i) The 
average recommendation of pairs of experts is not distinguishable from the perfectly informed 
equilibrium. (ii) The average recommendation from the pair of experts under the feedback 
conditions 5 tends to be closer to the perfectly informed equilibrium and tends to have less 
variability than the average of recommendations under the no feedback condition 4. 
 
Support: Under the no feedback conditions 4, the mean distance of the average expert 
recommendation is 8.12 and the standard deviation is 5.82. The mean distance and the standard 
deviation for committee decisions under the full feedback conditions 5 are 4.11 and 5.40, 
respectively. Result (i) is supported by the fact that the hypothesis that the average of the pair of 
recommendations equals the equilibrium under both conditions cannot be rejected. While the 
distributions of averages tend to be centered on the perfectly informed equilibrium, they are not 
the same. Result (ii) follows from the fact that the hypothesis of equality of means can be 
rejected. The average of recommendations from experts with unknown accuracy is further from 
the perfectly informed equilibrium and has greater variance than experts whose accuracy will 
become known. 
 
Observation 1:  Result 4 (i) suggests the need for a more refined equilibrium concept than Nash 
is needed to capture the decisions regarding expert recommendations.  
 
Given the recommendations of the other expert and given the tendency of the committee to 
accept the mean of recommendations as a signal of the state of nature, both experts have an 
incentive to give more exaggerated advice.  Given what the other does, and other things being 
equal, either expert can pull the mean of the advice and, the committee decision closer to the 
expert’s ideal point by giving more exaggerated (extreme) advice. Unless the advice is placed at 
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the edge of the state space, the advice could always be more extreme and thus, has a potential for 
drawing the mean closer to the expert’s ideal.  For some reason, increasing the exaggeration of 
advice does not appear productive to the experts.  One conjecture is that the equilibrium advice 
satisfies a more refined equilibrium concept in which the expert anticipates rejection should the 
advice move too closely to the extremes.
7
  How that might work is not obvious since neither 
expert knows the preferences of the other; and neither expert knows the preferences of any of the 
committee members. They only know that committee members have some qualitative 
information about their bias.  
 
Overall, the process has the appearance of two interacting equilibria. Conditional on the 
equilibrium of the revelation game of experts the committee converges to its equilibrium. The 
revelation game seems to have an equilibrium – state invertability property.  One equilibrium is 
dictated by the behavior of the experts and another dictated by the behavior of the committee.  Of 
course, these processes are interacting simultaneously so how the dynamics might behave or how 
the two equilibria might be approached separately is a matter for theoretical exploration. 
 
7. Summary of Conclusions 
 
The first of two basic questions posed for a process design is whether or not it does what it is 
supposed to do.  The dyadic process was designed to facilitate the transfer information from 
experts to an uninformed committee whose decision the experts wish to influence. Basically, it is 
designed to remove the power of those who have privately held information that could otherwise 
be used to influence the outcome of group deliberations.  The dyadic process involves choosing 
two experts with opposing interests and whose preferences (biases) are known to the committee 
members. The experts recommend an action to be taken by the committee using a formal 
protocol.  Precautions are taken to prevent expert collusion while letting experts adjust their 
recommendations in the light of deliberations. The competition between experts appears to be a 
key to removing the power they might otherwise have over the group decision. The result is that 
the committee decisions are near those that would be made if all committee members were 
experts or if the experts truthfully revealed the state. Basically, the dyadic procedure is 
successful but not perfect. 
 
The second question is whether or not the mechanism performed for understandable reasons. Are 
the principles and insights that lead to the design supported by behavior observed in the 
experiment or was success simply an accident of some sort? Support exists for aspects of theory. 
In particular, the rational expectations principles that lead to the design have some support in the 
data. As a group, committee members correctly anticipate the behavior of experts and in turn, 
experts respond to the possibility that that excessively exaggerated advice can result in a 
reduction of their influence. The interpretation is that voters observe the outcome of a game of 
influence among “insiders” (the experts) and from the equilibrium or from the observations of 
the dynamics of the game the voters find themselves able to infer the underlying information 
                                                          
7
 If the state is informally distributed a boundary of the   support is not a credible recommendation.  Thus, if the state 
has a uniformed distribution limits exist to credible recommendations in any particular direction. An experimental 
design used by Vespa and Wilson (2014) represents the state space as a Clifford toris in order to control for the 
boundaries when the state is produced by a uniform distribution. Such a construction permits extreme 
recommendations by experts without recognition that they are unlikely because of proximity to the boundary of the 
outcome space. 
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held by the insiders.  The interpretation suggests a possible role of information revealing 
equilibration from two interdependent processes. 
 
While the intuition of the information transfer and aggregation process is supported by the data, 
the result stands more as a discovery than a demonstration of mechanism reliability.  The 
intuition itself is not supported by a complete theory and the robustness of the result is not 
explored.  In the absence of a deeper theory, it is not clear how experiments that explore 
robustness should proceed.  Questions are easy to pose. The differences in the recommendations 
of experts appear to be important for triangulation on the state of nature by committee members.  
That individuals can discount biases is known (Chung and Harbaugh, 2014) but how that takes 
place in the context of an equilibrating process, is not known.  Is the information transfer to a 
single committee member facilitated by the voting patterns of other committee members or by 
the comments of the experts during committee deliberations? The communication protocols are 
known to be important as are the rules for collective decision (Hoffman and Plott, 1983) (Goeree 
and Yariv, 2011) in addition to the influence of parliamentary procedures themselves. How the 
information transfers of the system might adjust as a result of changes in the configuration of 
committee preferences is an open question. What happens if the equilibrium does not exist? 
Suppose different decision rules are in place, such as a veto player in which the equilibrium 
exists but the symmetry of the majority rule equilibrium is not present. How will the system 
behave if the experts have an incentive for implicit collusion? Is the key to the intuition about 
competition among experts captured by the fact that the committee equilibrium under certainty 
conditions is in the Pareto optimal set of the experts?  If the Pareto set among experts is an 
appropriate indicator of competition among experts, then would improved success follow from 
the addition of experts as long as the majority rule equilibrium (or even the core) is in the Pareto 
set of the experts?  If left a committee is left to its own devices, how would it choose experts? 
While this paper reports some key results, many questions about the robustness of the results 
exist and all invite more precise theory. 
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Appendix A 
 
Instructions 
 
General. You are about to participate in a committee process experiment in which one of 
numerous alternatives will be chosen by majority rule.  The purpose of the experiment is to gain 
insight into certain features of complex political processes.  The instructions are simple. If you 
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of 
money. You will be paid in cash. 
 
Instructions to Committee Members.  The alternatives are represented by points on the grid 
you’ve been given (these will also be drawn on the blackboard). The committee will adopt as the 
committee decision one and only one point. Your compensation depends on the particular point 
chosen by the committee (see attached payoff chart). Your payoff will be the value of the point 
(x, y). For example, suppose your payoff chart is that given in Figure 1 and that the committee’s 
final choice of alternative is the point (x,y) = (30,30). Your compensation in this event would be 
1,000. If the policy of the committee is (45,30) your compensation would be computed as 
follows: 
 
 
 
x-dimension 
y-
d
im
en
si
o
n
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 The point (45,30) is halfway between the point worth 10,000 and the curve worth 9,000, 
i.e., about 9,500.  There is a key in the upper right corner of the chart which gives the values of 
the curves.  The point in the middle of the circles is your peak point and worth the most to you.  
The curves are decreasing in value as you move away from this point. 
 
The compensation charts may differ among individuals.  This means that patterns of 
preferences differ and the monetary amounts may not be comparable.  The point which would 
result in the highest payoff to you may not result in the highest payoff to someone else.  You 
should decide what decision you want the committee to make and do whatever you wish 
within the confines of the rules to get things to go your way. The experimenters, however, are 
not primarily concerned with whether or how you participate so long as you stay within the 
confines of the rules. [Under no circumstances may you mention anything quantitative about 
your compensation.  You are free, if you wish, to indicate which ones you like best, etc., but you 
cannot mention anything about the actual monetary amounts.  Under no circumstances may you 
mention anything about activities which might involve you and other committee members after 
the experiment, i.e., no deals to split up afterward or no physical threats.]  In addition we would 
appreciate it if you would refrain from discussing the experiment after you’ve participated. 
 
Parliamentary Rules.  The process begins with an existing motion (200,150) on the floor.  You 
are free to propose amendments to this motion. Suppose, for example, (170,50) is the motion on 
the floor and you want the group to consider the point (140,125).  Simply raise your hand and 
when you are recognized by the chair, say “I move to amend the motion to (140,125).” The 
group will then proceed to vote on the amendment.  If the amendment passes by a majority vote, 
the point (140,125) is the new motion on the floor and is subject, itself, to amendments.  If the 
amendment fails, the motion (170,50) remains on the floor and is subject to further amendment.  
Thus, amendments simply change the motion on the floor. You may pass as many amendments 
as you wish. 
 At any time during the consideration of an amendment or the motion on the floor, a 
motion to end debate is in order.  If the motion to end debate fails, the amendment process 
continues.  If it passes, the motion currently on the floor goes through. 
 To sum up, the existing motion on the floor is (200,150).  You are free to amend this 
motion as you wish. The meeting will not end until a majority consents to end debate and accept 
some motion.  Your compensation will be determined by the motion on the floor finally adopted 
by the majority. 
 
Your Payoff:  In this experiment your payoff chart will depend on two values.  One of these, Sy, 
will be announced at the beginning of each period to everyone in the committee.  The other, Sx, 
will be unknown to you.  You have been given a grid with a 50x50 unit square drawn on it.  To 
generate your payoff chart in the case that Sy = 0, and X = 0, you should place the transparency 
on the grid so that the point corresponding to you payoff peak is on the bottom-left corner of the 
square.  For other values of Sx and Sy, for example 5 and 10, you should slide the transparency to 
the right along the horizontal line 5 units and then up 10 units.  If you have any questions on how 
to generate your payoff chart, raise your hand and the experimenter will demonstrate how to do 
this. 
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You will not know the value of Sx merely that it is some number between 0 and 50 and that all 
these values are equally likely.  Furthermore, the value of Sx in one period is unrelated to its 
value in any other period. 
 
INFORMATION 
In addition to the other committee members, there will be two informed parties. They will know 
with certainty the value of Sx every period. They will have no voting rights and have other 
limitations on what they can do or say as will be described below. For each of the informed 
parties, you will be told the relative position of their payoff peak to yours.  For example, if your 
payoff peak is at (50, 30) as in the example above, you may be told that informed party A’s peak 
is above you and to the left, so unlike the other committee members, you know something about 
their preferences. Their payoffs depend on the chosen point the same way yours does. They will 
be allowed to take part in all committee discussions, but only committee members will be able to 
vote. 
 
Instructions to “Informed” parties. You will be given the variable Sx at the beginning of each 
round.  Your payoffs will be partially known to the entire committee and are calculated in the 
same way as the committee members. You are not allowed to vote on amendments and you 
cannot reveal the value of Sx, but you are allowed to propose amendments and take part in any 
other discussions in committee. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 We would like you to answer the questions on the attached page.  These should help you 
understand the instructions. 
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Test 
 
1. For Sx = 20, Sy = 5 at ____________ I would make the most possible money. 
 
2. Suppose (200,150) is the motion on the floor and an amendment to move to  
point (199,149) passes (fails), then the new motion on the floor is_____,____ 
(_____,_____) ? 
3. True or false: Sx is more likely to fall between 20 and 30 that 
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Appendix B 
 
COMMITTEE INSIDERS LAB PROCEDURES 
 
Motions and proposals are listed on the board and graphed on the board. 
 
THE GRAPH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE FORMAL MOTION LISTING 
 
The experimenter maintains a table on the board with the following information. 
 
 Floor 
motion 
Proposed 
amendment: 
move to 
Amendment 
proposer 
Discussion second 
and 
Voting 
For 
 
 (200,150)      
  (20,30) Suggestion A    
  (100,100) Suggestion B    
  (100,100) 1 A (up, right) 
B 
(down, right) 
1,2 failed 
  (50,50) 6  1,4,6,3 passed 
 (50,50)      
  (75,85) 4  1,4 failed 
       
       
 
THE PROCEDURE 
 
The experimenter is the chair. Motion on floor is (200, 150) 
Call for suggestions from the informed. Suggestions listed on table and drawn on figure. “A suggests that 
the motion be moved from (200, 150) down by 130 and to the left by 170 to here.” 
   
The graph follows the real 
time action. The motion on 
the floor is always a point. 
Arrows leading to it are the 
history. Failed amendments 
are also shown.  When data 
become too messy then old 
data are removed. 
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Call for motions.  #1 says “I propose to amend to (100,100)” . #2 I second.  Discussion? The informed can 
give directions (Up and left, down and right, etc.) All in favor? #1 and #2 vote for and #3,4,5 do not. 
Motion failed. The motion on the floor remains (200,250). 
 
